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Abstract
Hezbollah is a unique organization that acts as a transnational group, an insurgent group and a
major political party in Lebanon. Since the founding of Hezbollah, they have found social
service provisions to be an important aspect of their organization and have had immense control
over the territory, acting as a state within the state of Lebanon. Hezbollah offers an
organizational structure, a conflict resolution mechanism, healthcare, education and much more
to their primarily Shi’a constituents, however to other sects as well. My master’s thesis seeks to
examine the reasons that Hezbollah does offer these social service provisions. Through the lens
of rebel governance, I hypothesize that it is for both strategic and ideological reasons. I then
provide an empirical analysis of my hypothesis, using evidence of what Hezbollah does, their
leadership, historical reasoning and statements.
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Introduction
Hezbollah is a Shi’a political party and military organization located in southern Lebanon.
Hezbollah was founded in 1982 as a response to the Israeli occupation of Southern Lebanon,
identifying itself as a resistance movement and a way of safeguarding southern Lebanon from
Israeli occupation and military incursions (Ṭarābulsī, 2012). It is now the strongest party
representing the Shiite, working both as a resistance movement, as well as to give voice to the
Shiite population that equates its proportional size in Lebanon. While Lebanon is 95% composed
of Arabs, much of Lebanon's diversity lies in religion, with 19 tribes and five major religions Maronite Christians, Greek Orthodox Christians, Greek Catholics, Sunni Muslims, Shi’a
Muslims and Druzes. Hezbollah’s territorial presence in Lebanon is directly correlated with
communities heavily dominated by Shi’a (Mapping Global Insecurity Project, 2018).
Hezbollah spans approximately half of Lebanon’s 26 districts and Lebanon’s state
borders, with its presence extending further into Syria [Appendix A]. Historically, Hezbollah has
had a strong presence in southern Lebanon, primarily being located in the Bint Jbeil district
along the Lebanese-Israeli border. Over time, Hezbollah has expanded its control, particularly
since the Syrian war in 2011 into the north and east, as well as into southern Beirut. Hezbollah
has also been extremely successful in connecting its diaspora community throughout the world,
creating a united front, as well as a source of funding (Mapping Global Insecurity Project, 2018).
Hezbollah is spread out across the world, having been identified throughout the Middle East,
Latin America, North America, and Africa. Over time, Hezbollah has dramatically grown in size
and become a key component of the cultural, political and social narratives in Lebanon.
However, to the international community, Hezbollah is deemed a terrorist or insurgent group.
Since 1995, the United States has classified Hezbollah as a terrorist organization (Mapping
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Global Insecurity Project, 2018). The U.S. is concerned regarding Hezbollah’s relationship with
Iran and that Hezbollah is a threat to U.S. objectives in the region.
The central question to be examined is: Why does Hezbollah offer social service provisions?
Through a case study analysis using rebel governance as a theoretical framework and as an entry
point for analysis, I hypothesize that Hezbollah offers social service provisions for ideological
and strategic reasons. I acknowledge alternative explanations for Hezbollah’s offering of social
service provisions, such as resource extraction or rebel groups benefit. However, for the reasons
stated herein, I have ruled these out as potential supporting factors. As a background of analysis
to why Hezbollah offers social service provisions, I analyze their funding methods and what
social service provisions Hezbollah has chosen to offer. Based on this analysis, I discuss
implications of examining Hezbollah and future questions that can be raised. I conclude with the
importance of this research for broader policy recommendations.
Hezbollah’s Funding Methods
Hezbollah receives funding to support its work through various legal and illegal methods. Forbes
has estimated that the annual turnover is at least $500 million (Forbes, 2014). A portion of its
money comes from legal revenues and the global diaspora; however, Hezbollah is also a hub for
a variety of illicit activities ranging from charities and front organizations to the smuggling of
drugs and weapons, extortion, taxation and money laundering. This has led Hezbollah to become
a producer, transit zone and destination for legal and illegal products that are used to help
promote Hezbollah’s agenda of establishing a Shi’a entity in Lebanon and protecting themselves
from international efforts from keeping that from happening (Brown and Hermann, 2020; Levitt,
2005). Hezbollah has a parallel global economy that exploits globalization and intersects with the
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rest of the global economy. With the position of Hezbollah as a recognized legitimate political
party in Lebanon, it is challenging for countries such as the United States to prevent funding
(Mapping Global Insecurity Project, 2018).

Diaspora - Charities
Hezbollah’s diaspora community has served as a major contributor to funding the organization
and as a hub for licit and illicit activities. While some insecurity flows occur through Hezbollah’s
territory, the majority is facilitated outside Lebanon with illegally obtained revenue. A primary
way that the diaspora community functions is through charities that funnel money back to
Hezbollah. Charities and non-governmental organizations have been a primary funder of
Hezbollah and can be legitimate or illegitimate. Some of the charities are located in Lebanon,
however, most are set up around the world for funds to be routed back to Hezbollah. In more
legitimate forms, charities occur where Muslims give ‘zakat’ - a Muslim religious duty where
individuals are required to donate a certain proportion of their wealth each year to charitable
causes. The money donated is then given to Hezbollah which is a large contributor to social
services in Lebanon. One example is Goodwill Charitable Organization in Dearborn, Michigan
which has been found to raise funds and launder money for Hezbollah’s Martyrs Foundation
(Brown and Hermann, 2020).

Money Laundering
In more illicit forms, Hezbollah has money laundering schemes across the globe, primarily in
North America, South America and Africa. Money laundering schemes take place when obtained
funds are transmitted through Lebanese or international financial systems before Hezbollah
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claims them. One specific example that has been identified is automobile trafficking. Traffickers
withdraw money from banks and purchase used cars in the United States. The cars are then
shipped to West Africa (typically Benin) where they are then sold at a profit. This money is then
laundered through Ghana and then Togo, and then finally returned to Hezbollah in Lebanon. This
scheme was exposed when traffickers withdrew money from the Lebanese Canadian Bank and
then purchased cars. Hezbollah’s diaspora community and money laundering have been
particularly strong in South America, specifically the informal economy in Ciudad del Este,
Paraguay which is heavily dependent on Lebanese and Chinese businessmen who have migrated
to Paraguay. Approximately 30,000 Lebanese Arabs now live in the area, many sympathetic to
Hezbollah. They assist in funding and have now accounted for over $20 million of Hezbollah’s
budget (Brown and Hermann, 2020).

Drugs and Drug Trafficking
Hezbollah has been heavily implicated in aiding narcotics traffickers across the globe from
Central America to South America and Africa. Hezbollah has been found to work in cooperation
with Latin American drug cartels to ship cocaine and has been involved in the manufacturing and
trafficking of amphetamine, Captagon, throughout the Middle East. Within the disputed Bekaa
Valley, Hezbollah has been involved in the production and trafficking of narcotics, particularly,
in relation to working with drug lords to facilitate the drug trade of hashish. While the Bekaa
Valley is a heavy producer of hashish, Hezbollah has not been found to have been tied to this
production. Instead, Hezbollah has used the Bekaa Valley to traffic drugs on the border with
Syria. Trafficking in this sense is often done in coordination with the Shiite drug class that
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ensures supply lines for fighting and in exchange Hezbollah protects them from law
enforcement.

Weapons and Military
One of Hezbollah’s illicit activities is weapons procurement and smuggling. They have procured
some of these weapons as a result of Iran smuggling them through all means available airplanes, ships and land routes through Syria. Arms smuggling has been identified through
various routes - such as the ports in Beirut and the town of Ghajar. Across the globe, Hezbollah
also is exporting its security skills and military strength through the training of insurgents. This
notably occurred with the Houthis in Yemen (Mapping Global Insecurity Project, 2018).

Relationship with Ministries
Hezbollah has also been able to procure much of its legal and illegal forms of funding because of
its control over the Ministry of Finance. Having control in the Ministry of Finance helps
safeguard Hezbollah’s involvement in illicit activities - such as money laundering and security
from the state. This is especially important for funding from the diaspora. Further, control in the
ministry allows Hezbollah to direct resources to benefit its constituents. This is made possible
because the director-general of each ministry has access to dedicated funds that can be deployed
without the minister’s signature. Thus, Hezbollah can access funds regardless of who the
minister is at a particular moment. In a typical fashion, parties would acquire funds through
grants to NGOs, legitimate or illegitimate. However, within a ministry Hezbollah can acquire
additional funds. Another intergovernmental method for acquiring funding is through cabinet
decrees regarding “public benefits associations” which were once designated public benefits
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associations. Parties are then eligible for aid from the government and municipalities and are
then exempted from all taxes and fees, as well as from customs on all purchases. Hezbollah has
used these as a cover for some security activities (Khatib, 2016).

Banks
Banks have been found to have been an advantage in the transmission of resources through their
increased security compared to cash and their ability to be accessed anywhere instantaneously.
However, banks can also cause an increased risk of detection. Thus, some banks operate on the
edge of legality and are usually the initial way for illegal money to enter the international
banking system. These banks will hold the accounts of not only residents but also of members of
transnational groups, terrorist organizations, or other insurgent groups ((Brown and Hermann,
2020). Hezbollah is funded in part due to its relations with the Western Union. Hezbollah has
been noted to have owned ⅓ of the Western Union (Mapping Global Insecurity Project, 2018).
In testimony before the U.S. Senate, Dr. Matthew Levitt, director of the Stein Program on
Counterterrorism and Intelligence at The Washington Institute, observed the use of local
Hezbollah operatives in Western Union offices in southern Lebanon. It is believed that in some
cases “Hezbollah gets a cut of 7% service fee charge split between Western Union and the local
agent”. While “in other cases, Hezbollah simply uses the money wiring company to launder and
transfer funds'’ (Brown and Hermann, 2020: 115). Hezbollah has been able to turn illicit money
into licit money through local organizations getting the money into the international banking
system.
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International Aid
Hezbollah has received a large amount of external support that has allowed its illicit activities to
flourish. Iran has been believed to be a large funder of Hezbollah since its founding through
substantial monetary, logistical, arms and tactical support (Mapping Global Insecurity Project,
2018). It is believed that, as of 2005, Iran has funded at least $100 million per year to Hezbollah
and that number is estimated to now be closer to $700 or $800 million. Iran is likely to fund
Hezbollah for several reasons including its interest in destabilizing Israel. Iran is also responsible
for much of the financial support in the form of weaponry. These weapons can be traced from
Iran to Syria, where they are then trucked to the Bekaa Valley in Lebanon. Iran is also known for
funding based on how successful the groups they are funding are or for a specific objective. For
example, it is reported that Hezbollah received an additional $22 million from Iranian
intelligence after the death of Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat. However, Hezbollah has not been
silent about receiving funding from Iran but rather states that it is only for the purposes of
supporting health care, education and war widows (Levitt, 2005). External support has also come
from outside of Iran. During the Syrian Civil War, Russia provided Hezbollah with logistical and
arms support. Even during the 2006 war, Hezbollah purchased intelligence information from
corrupt Israeli officials to aid the organization in its operations. Hezbollah’s assistance to the
Houthis in Yemen was returned when the Houthis raised funds to finance Hezbollah following
the explosion at the Beirut port in 2020 (Mapping Global Insecurity Project, 2018). The German
government has also helped fund Hezbollah through the Refugee Club Impulse, seeking to assist
the Middle Eastern refugee population in Germany (Brown and Hermann, 2020).
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What types of social service provisions does Hezbollah offer?
Hezbollah provides social service provisions - that is, a stock of needed materials or supplies - to
constituents in its territory including security structure, conflict resolution mechanisms,
healthcare, social services, the building of infrastructure and more. What Hezbollah has to offer
would be beneficial as the population seems to have low levels of satisfaction in the areas of
education, healthcare and overall governmental performance. These are primarily designated to
its Shi’a constituents, however, Hezbollah has also serviced other sects. While Hezbollah
organizes its services to the Shi’a population it does not impose its fundamentalist doctrine on
the inhabitants of its controlled territory. With participation in the political process, Hezbollah
has seen a gradual moderation of its religious alterations to have a wider base of support amongst
more constituents. Hezbollah has even been rumored to have trained and fought alongside the
Lebanese Christians when fighting the Islamic State (Mapping Global Insecurity Project, 2018).
In 2007, it was estimated that 50 percent of Hezbollah's budget was dedicated to the social
service effort. Hezbollah has also developed subgroups and organizations that support the
specialized functions of the community - the reconstruction group, the construction group, JBDG
(Love, 2010). The use of organizations, rules and institutions in Hezbollah’s territory are
therefore very similar to the rest of Lebanon (Mapping Global Insecurity Project, 2018).
Hezbollah has evolved as a political party to have entered the ministries. Having
Hezbollah’s top officials working within the ministries has allowed Hezbollah to have significant
influence over the Lebanese government. As of 2018, Hezbollah together with groups and
individuals that are politically aligned to (Reuters). Hezbollah is also able to obtain significant
resources for its operations and social service provisions. Hezbollah’s March 8 Alliance with the
two Christian parties (Maranda and FPM) and subsequent relationship with Lebanese President
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Michel Aoun has given Hezbollah a notable amount of presence in Lebanon. Due to this alliance,
Hezbollah maintained a minimal direct presence in the government, while also having a
significant amount of influence to have a steady flow of services to Hezbollah’s constituents and
support for Hezbollah's interests (Khatib, 2016). Hezbollah officials can then have parallel
control over the Lebanese government and the Hezbollah party.

Organizational Structure and Conflict Resolution
Hezbollah is organized with the hierarchy being the Shura Council, with the de facto leader
being the Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah. The Shura Council (Consultative Council) was
originally established between 1984 and 1986 but transitioned to its current form in 1989 during
a general reorganization, led by Hassan Nasrallah. This Council is Hezbollah’s central decisionmaking authority on the national level in charge of forming the overall vision and policies, and
overseeing the general strategies of the Party’s functions and political decisions. The
reorganization formed the Council to have nine members elected for one year with Hezbollah’s
principal cadres occupying the position of Section Head – the subordinates of each of the subunit heads of Hezbollah’s five Councils. The Council’s membership was reduced to seven
members each serving two-year terms then later extended to three years. There are some claims
that an eighth member was added, however, his name was not published for fear of assassination
(“Organizational Chart”) [See Appendix B].
The Shura Council has five subordinate specialized Councils (Executive, Judicial,
Parliamentary, Political and Jihad). Each of these specialized councils overseas sub-entities
across various sectors. The Executive Council, founded in 1995, manages the daily operations of
the party with eight subunits - Social, Education, Islamic Health, Finance, Unions, External
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Relations and Affiliation and Coordination. The Jihad Council, founded in 1995, monitors,
supervises, and directs attacks against the Israeli occupying forces. The Judicial Council was
founded between 1993 and 2003 as Hezbollah began asserting control over Baalbek-Hermel,
Beirut’s southern suburbs and Iqulim al-Tuffah. It is Hezbollah’s primary conflict resolution
mechanism that engages in adjudication, arbitration, and mediation. The Parliamentary Council,
founded in 1995 evaluates Hezbollah's parliamentary performance to strengthen the effectiveness
of the elected party representatives. The Political Council was established in 1995 as an advisory
council assisting the Secretary-General and the Shura Council to follow up on the party’s day-today political activities, put together political programs, and electoral platforms, organize
campaign committees and establish and maintain political alliances (“Organizational Chart”)[See
Appendix B].

Military Strength and Security
A factor that distinguishes Hezbollah is that it is the only legitimate political party that is
officially armed. Since 2008, several ministerial statements have stated how Hezbollah is the
only legitimately armed entity in Lebanon, aside from the Lebanese Armed Forces. These
ministerial statements do not state the reasons that Hezbollah has this right to have a military
force. The purpose of Hezbollah’s founding as a resistance movement to the Israeli occupation is
likely to be a fundamental reason that it is still an armed party today. In 1989, the Taif
Agreement formally ended Lebanon’s civil war and stated that all Lebanese and non-Lebanese
militias would be disbanded. At the end of Lebanon's civil war, Lebanon was still under Israeli
occupation and therefore allowed Hezbollah to maintain its weapons to fight Israel’s occupation.
However, when Israel withdrew from south Lebanon in 2000, both the Lebanese government and
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Hezbollah agreed that the Israeli occupation of disrupted territories along the southern border Shebaa Farms - allows Hezbollah to maintain its weapons because they are seen as necessary to
protect and liberate Lebanon from Israel (Khatib, 2016). Hezbollah’s reliance on its militia to
keep order threatens the legitimacy and scope of the Lebanese government while at the same
time ensuring Hezbollah’s role in Lebanese politics and decision making (Brown and Hermann,
2020).
Over time, Hezbollah’s military strength continues to grow and is often stronger than the
Lebanese Armed Forces. Where Lebanon has often not been able to use its military, in contrast,
Hezbollah has been strong (Brown and Hermann, 2020). However, Hezbollah does continue to
regularly coordinate with the Lebanese Armed Forces, ensuring synergy and facilitation of
operations. Some leaders in the Lebanese Armed Forces have even shown favorable views
towards Hezbollah. Others who do not have favorable views have not been able to form concrete
policies, likely as there could be fear of retaliation by Hezbollah (Hezbollah: An Introduction,
2018). Despite cooperation with the Lebanese Armed Forces, Hezbollah does have de facto
control over the military intelligence through Shi’a officers serving in the military. Hezbollah
deepened its military influence by infiltrating the security apparatus of the government. An
example of this is when Hezbollah lobbied for the director-general of the General Security
position to be held by a Shi’a when it was formerly assigned to a Maronite Christian. The
General Security position was able to falsify identity documents to travel internationally
unnoticed and thereby provide a source of intelligence - specifically counterintelligence.
Counterintelligence was one of the first security concerns of Hezbollah, dating back to the
middle 1980s and the use of double agents to defend against Israel (Wege, 2008). Lebanon did
adopt the security formula of “the army, the people and the resistance,” which benefited
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Hezbollah through a sense of legitimacy within the state, without the accountability required of a
state institution. The security formula allows Hezbollah to broaden how much it can act under
the pretext of protecting Lebanon. Further, it distinguishes between the army and the resistance,
which creates a separation from using security sector reform measures on Hezbollah (Khatib,
2016).
Hezbollah demonstrated its strength through its assistance to Syria during the Syrian civil
war - particularly through the training of street fighters and fighting. A potential reason
Hezbollah chose to assist Syria was to protect its own interests, such as trade, and keep the war
from coming into Lebanon, as well as to keep Russia out of Hezbollah’s business. When
analyzing the cities in which Hezbollah was fighting with Syria, Hezbollah has notably only
participated in attacks and battles that were on the border of Lebanon or were of strategic
importance [Appendix C]. On May 25, 2013, Nasrallah stated that Hezbollah was fighting in the
Syrian Civil War against Islamic extremists and that Hezbollah would not allow the Syrian
militants to control areas that border Lebanon, specifically, noting the city of Al-Qusayr (Bassej,
2013). Hezbollah's heavy assistance indicated that they are more than a small group, but rather
they are a group that can export their power through their military (Hermann, Margaret).
Hezbollah is responsible for directing the area’s municipal police through a local liaison
officer from Hezbollah coordinating with the head of the municipality. However, Hezbollah does
not provide the salaries to the 1,000 members of the police force (Khatib, 2016). The police
functions have been an important step of social service provisions for Hezbollah as it creates a
domestic side of their security measures. With control over the police, Hezbollah can maintain
the view of integrity for the party through their coordination with the Lebanese government,
while also being able to take advantage of having this security apparatus. Having functions and
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control over the police gave Hezbollah the benefit of having both a military and international
security presence as well as a domestic security presence (Wege, 2008).

Construction and Infrastructure
Hezbollah has focused a significant amount of attention and money on rebuilding infrastructure,
particularly compared to the Lebanese government. The reconstruction group has been a part of
Hezbollah since 1983. As a surrogate to the State of Lebanon’s effort to assist Shi’a communities
in the Bekaa and the South, it is responsible for addressing critical deficiencies, such as repairing
war damage. The NGO, JBDG - meaning mother’s helping hand - was created in Iran to assist
with reconstruction and then this structure was exported to Lebanon and used to support the
strategic goals of Hezbollah through the building of infrastructure (Love, 2010). Particularly
after the 2006 war, Hezbollah spent a large amount of money and a significant amount of effort
on rebuilding the infrastructure of southern Lebanon. It is essentially unheard of for an
organization to pay for the rebuilding of the country even if it has control over the given territory
(Mapping Global Insecurity Project, 2018). Hezbollah initiated a reconstruction plan without the
assistance of the Lebanese government, allowing Hezbollah to provide immediate assistance to
civilians. Hezbollah’s speed compared to the government proved its efficiency. In a decree, the
Jihad al-Bina Association was to be directed by Hezbollah’s Executive Council which deals with
several aspects of “construction, agriculture, water, roads, industry and environmental
protection”. It has been recorded that “between 1988 and 2002, the Jihad al-Bina built or
renovated 35 schools, 9,000 homes, 800 shops, 5 hospitals, 8 clinics, 100 mosques, 8 cultural
centers and 7 agricultural centers cooperatives” (Love, 2010).
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Hezbollah had control over the agricultural portfolio from 2009 until 2014. In 2010, the
research group Stratfor stated that one of the reasons that Hezbollah wanted control over the
Ministry of Agriculture was for ammonium nitrate to manufacture explosives. In 2011,
Hezbollah’s Minister of Agriculture, Hussein al-Hajj Hassam, was accused of distributing the
benefits of the government's new measures aimed at improving agricultural infrastructure to
Hezbollah territories rather than agriculturally dominant areas. Further, Hezbollah was reported
to have purchased fertilizer from Syria through the ministry, which was shipped to Hezbollah
agents to be stored in Hezbollah warehouses. Eyewitnesses stated that Hezbollah's influence
facilitated its illicit drug trade with the ease of falsifying paperwork to declare illegal goods as
seeds for agriculture. Hezbollah then uses its influence to compel municipalities and the state to
work with Jihad al-Bina, even having the Ministry of Agriculture sign off on an official
cooperating protocol with Jihad al-Bina to provide agricultural activities and training. Therefore,
Hezbollah can take credit for projects and provide services to citizens in Hezbollah’s territory.
Further, Jihad al-Bina’s ties with the Ministry of Transport and Public Works were used to
expand Hezbollah’s security infrastructure. Jihad al-Bina covertly uses public money to expand
underground infrastructure and security facilities operated by Hezbollah. Jihad al-Bina’s
registration as a private sector company in 2005 (Arch Consulting), significantly impacted the
development of Hezbollah’s technological capacities through cooperation with Compu-House - a
computer software selling company (Khatib, 2016).

Private Affairs and Social Well-Being
Welfare is given to the wounded, killed, or martyred in the fight against Israel to meet Islamic
requirements for zakat. This provided peace of mind to soldiers so that soldiers would know they
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and their families would be cared for if they were to sustain an injury or be killed. The three
main organizations were the Martyrs Foundation, Foundation for the Wounded, and the
Women’s Association. The Martyr Foundation provided support to families, the Foundation for
the Wounded helped fighters and civilians wounded in Israeli attacks and the Women’s
Association assisted women’s rights and protected women who were widowed and wives of
martyrs (Love, 2010). The Martyr Foundation was designed as a public benefit association that
gains from working closely with the Ministry of Public Health where it has been able to acquire
state-subsidized medical equipment, pharmaceuticals and ambulances (Khatib, 2016).
All three of these organizations did have some directional focus and attention to families
and women. Women are a necessary facet to the overall success of rebel governance. Through
organizations that work to protect women or the well-being of families, Hezbollah has
acknowledged the critical role that women play in advancing its governance structure. The
acknowledgment of women through their important roles and organizations dedicated to their
well-being demonstrates that women have played an influential role and have worked themselves
into positions of influence. Women, as also seen in the position of Hezbollah, are not just
civilians being protected by men, but have a role in the success of social service provisions.
Hezbollah has provided care to roughly half a million Lebanese citizens annually for free
or at reduced rates (Love, 2010). Before Lebanon's financial crisis in 2019, Hezbollah was using
its control in the Health Ministry to coordinate with pharmacies in southern Lebanon, the Bekaa
Valley and southern Beirut, allowing Hezbollah to offer medications at a lower price. The
involvement in pharmaceutical trade, illicit and licit, was an important source of revenue for
Hezbollah. The health minister position, formed in 2020, is under Hamad Hassan, a member of
Hezbollah. In 2021, Hamad Hassam granted a license to New Allapharama to import the
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Sinopharm COVID-19 vaccine into Lebanon (Khatib, 2016). Further, Hezbollah bought
financially troubled pharmacies, such as those in Tyre and Nabatiyah, allowing them to sell at
cheaper prices (Ghaddar, 2020). Further, the Islamic Health Organization structure was
replicated in Iran and then replicated by Hezbollah after its development in 1984 and was
responsible for providing health and medical services, clinics, medications, evacuation of
casualties and food distribution.
Hezbollah established a grocery chain with three stores in the south, two in the Bekaa
Valley and two in the suburbs of Beirut - Al-Nour Markets. Hezbollah also created a social
security card system for Hezbollah members - the Al-Sajed card. The Al-Sajed card allows
products to be bought at a discounted price. Every month the card is refilled with 300,000 liras or
$200 (Ghaddar, 2020) (Khatib, 2016).
Hezbollah also dedicates some care to the youth. Part of this is the Imam Al-Mahdi
Scouts - that is, a youth movement that teaches younger generations Shiite Islam centered on
Hezbollah’s principles and those of the Wali al-Faqih. In Imam Al-Mahdi, the scouts also
participate in traditional activities such as camping, playing sports, and assisting charities. The
scouts are between the ages of 8 and 16. They are transferred to the military wing at the age of
17.
Hezbollah has also focused on education. From 1996 to 2001, Hezbollah spent $14
million on scholarships and financial aid to educate thousands of Shi’a citizens. In addition,
Hezbollah has reduced or covered tuition costs under their educational branch. The branch also
coordinated school construction and administered education from preschool to vocational level.
This includes staffing the schools, developing and implementing a particular curriculum for
kindergarten through college-level students, publishing costs and other supporting materials. The
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number of places for the Shi’a community in the Lebanese civil service is limited by quota, thus
Hezbollah helps Shi’a candidates prepare for the Civil Service Board entrance examinations.
According to one account, Hezbollah uses its influence in the government to put pressure on the
board to reduce the pass mark or leak examination questions so its constituents can be better
prepared (Khatib, 2016).
What is rebel governance?
Rebel governance is a large field. The definition of rebel governance is often contested. In fact,
scholars of rebel governance have included a very broad definition of what rebel governance is.
Three scholars of rebel governance have guided the main definitions and focus going forward Zachariah Mampilly, Nelson Kasfir, and Ana Arjona. These three scholars came together to
write Rebel Governance in Civil War, where they lay out scopes, conditions, and a definition for
rebel governance. Kasfir highlights how civil war is the common condition for rebel governance
and establishes the class of cases in which rebel organizations can govern citizens - that being a
protracted armed conflict within a recognized sovereign state between parties subject to a
common authority at the onset of the fighting over civilians and territory (Kasfir, 2019). The
expectation of protracted violence is a defining condition of rebel governance with the first act of
violence by the rebel group against the government or other rebel groups as an appropriate
starting date for rebellion (Kasfir, 2019). In a conflict, civilian collaboration is often a central and
immediate concern for both warring sides. However, the determinants of civilian support are
often debated (Kasfir, 2019). Broadly, rebel governance is defined as organizing civilians for a
public purpose. Therefore, rebel governance analyzes the behavior of governments formed and
operating under armed threats without the benefit of sovereignty. Kasfir denotes a broad
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definition of rebel governance to set a low threshold for inclusion, within the scope conditions
(Kasfir, 2019).
To understand rebel governance, there are basic conditions to consider - that is, to create
a government, rebels must secure populated territory under conditions or threat of violence, and
they must choose to engage with at least some of the civilian residents. In determining what
ways rebels involve citizens, one must examine the three basic categories of how rebels organize
- civilian participation, civilian administration and civilian production of wealth (Kasfir, 2019).
The presence of these is sufficient to indicate governance - whether through formal or informal
structures (Kasfir, 2019). A broad notion of governance would include these three factors and it
is considered rebels practicing governance if they provide any trait of at least one of these three
variables (Kasfir, 2019).
I.

Civilian Participation: Civil participation analyzes involvement with the rebel group and
indicates whether rebel governance is working. The most important thing is whether rebels
are encouraging it and, if they do, whether it is coercive or voluntary. Indicators of voluntary
participation and encouraging civilian participation include a structure for expression that has
autonomy from rebels, through structures such as the creation of legislature, civilian advisory
boards, or local councils (Kasfir, 2019). However, popular support of insurgents is not
civilian participation, rather must flow through formal or informal rebel-sanctioned
structures.

II.

Civilian Administration: Civilian administration is a formal structure that can be used to
organize civilians in either all or a part of the rebel’s territory. The main question is whether
a structure is created or not, and then whether it is organized informally or with formal rules.
Some common forms of civil administration are supplying public order and taxation.
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III.

Civilian Production of Wealth: With rebels needing funds, rebels must devote some energy
and resources towards the civil production of wealth - that is, organizing civilians for
production or acquiring their goods by sale, seizure, or taxation. Income to rebel groups can
only come from high-value accessible goods and services that the group can use to defend
itself. However, these can be things that civilians find desirable (organizing markets,
facilitating the transport of smuggled goods) or undesirable (kidnapping, protection rackets).
Rebels may choose to have civilians produce goods and services or expel civilians from
certain areas to have fighters produce the goods and services. However, it is minimal
governance even if the civilians remain in the rebel territory.

There are three other scope conditions to consider in examining whether rebels are capable of
rebel governance and provide basic boundaries of the field - territorial control, a resident
population, and violence or threat of violence (Kasfir, 2019). Territorial control can be difficult
to identify as it is often fluid with civilians fleeing and violence that is episodic. Territorial
control must be looked at separately from domination as rebels may choose to hold territory
without governing their residents. Domination is the degree of civilian compliance an insurgent
organization can elicit within the territory it controls and can provide a useful approach to
understanding which activities are included in a particular case. Territorial control is the capacity
of a rebel group to keep its enemies out of a specific area. To test for capacity to govern is
whether the degree of territorial control is sufficient to permit rebel leaders to organize structures
in which civilians participate. A resident population is that there is a population over which the
rebel group will have control. Violence does not need to be ongoing, but rather there needs to be
a threat of violence. A complete disappearance of the threat of violence is an indication that the
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group no longer meets this scope condition and is technically no longer a rebel organization.
While there may not be violence occurring, the rebel group may still not have foreign recognition
despite still having control over the territory and having a governance structure (Kasfir 2019: 26
- 31). In this case and all cases of rebel governance, sovereignty is the most important
characteristic that rebels lack (Kasfir, 2019).
How does Hezbollah fit rebel governance?
For purposes of this thesis paper, I will use Kasfir’s rebel governance definition, scopes and the
conditions of rebel governance from Rebel Governance in Civil War to evaluate Hezbollah.
Using Rebel Governance in Civil War, Hezbollah fits the rebel governance framework. In the
broad definition of rebel governance, Hezbollah does fit through the organization of civilians
within a rebel-held territory for public purposes. As the basis of cases to consider, Hezbollah was
born out of the conditions of a civil war, that being the Lebanese Civil War from 1975 to 1990.
Hezbollah also has committed acts of violence outside of the state, against Israel, but also within
Lebanon against other sects. Despite the civil war and sectarian battle within Lebanon,
Hezbollah has and does accept the pre-existing governmental structures in Lebanon. Therefore,
Hezbollah does fit within the necessary scope of cases having secured a populated territory under
the threat of violence and choosing to engage with civilians.
In the first set of three conditions, Hezbollah is consistent with all which is sufficient to
provide governance, thus holding with the definition of rebel governance. Civilian participation,
civilian administration and civilian production of wealth, have all been active parts of
Hezbollah's organization, structure, and follow-through. Hezbollah has active civilian
participation through both formal and informal rebel-sanctioned structures that are administrative
in organization for civilians. Civil administration is identified through the forms of public order
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that Hezbollah offers those in its territory. Further, the civilians are part of the production of
wealth through the engagement of these structures and economic structures to provide funding to
Hezbollah. Hezbollah is therefore considered practicing governance because they have not just
one, but all three of these variables.
Hezbollah also holds the conditions of territorial control, a resident population, and
violence or threat of violence. In terms of territorial control, Hezbollah can keep enemies out of
its territory. Further, it has both a residential population within its territory and there is a
perpetual threat of violence. Due to its tight organizational skills, Hezbollah has been able to
govern territory and have the cooperation of individuals, including the farms in the Bekaa Valley
that separate them from Syria. Hezbollah squarely fits the meaning of rebel governance through
fitting the broad definition and subsequent scopes and conditions. However, Hezbollah is unique
in the sense that while it began as a rebel governance structure and still has aspects of rebel
governance, it has been working in parallel within the existing government, becoming a
legitimate political party and having members within the Lebanese government. This is of
particular interest as Hezbollah has become a part of the government and complete rebel
governance without the civil war being its own. This makes Hezbollah a unique organization,
rebel group and political party worthy of being studied. While many authors have acknowledged
that Hezbollah fits the scope of rebel governance (Sümeyye Kaya-Uyar, Belgin San-Akca, James
Worrall), an examination of why Hezbollah specifically offers social service provisions has not
been done.
Why does Hezbollah provide provisions?
There are several reasons that rebel governances decide to offer provisions. Some groups offer
rebel governance and social service provisions for strategic purposes, but some may believe in
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the importance of governing civilian affairs in a broader sense, beyond strategic considerations.
Other groups offer governance because of ideology and will only take care of a population that
shares their ideology or religious identities, but not taking care of other populations (Arjona,
2019). Hezbollah has penetrated networks and continues to expand its influence over local life
(Arjona, 2019). The provisions that it has provided have led to vast communal developments,
while at the same time creating a dependence on Hezbollah for basic goods and services, dually
making it less likely for the Shiite residents to oppose Hezbollah’s control. The use of illicit
activities by Hezbollah funds its political agenda and political party and “has created a societal
dependence on projects financed with ‘dirty’ money (Brown and Hermann, 2020: 82). The
Lebanese government is unable to provide the same services that Hezbollah does and is unlikely
to be able to provide these should Hezbollah no longer exist (Brown and Hermann, 2020).

Ideological reasons for providing provisions
Lebanon was a former French colony until 1943 when Lebanon gained independence from the
French (Love, 2010). The French method of colonization was to bring leadership to the new land
controlled by it and that land became a satellite with an exchange of personnel coming from
France into Lebanon. When the French colonizers left, they left a governance structure, but they
had given very little to the Shi’a community. The Christian sects had received the position of
presidency despite not being the largest sect and the position of Prime Minister was given to the
Sunni Muslims. The Shi’a were given the position of President of Parliament, however, they
were not a smaller sect and were quickly growing. Further, the governance structure was set up
to be a 6:5 ratio of Christians to Muslims (Faruki, 1974). The lack of equal power given to the
Shi’a constituency, is a possible reason that Hezbollah does not seek to be a separate state.
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Hezbollah is not necessarily looking to become a separate state, but rather it seeks equal power.
Despite being the largest sect, the Shi’a were given a lesser role when the French colonizers left.
As Nawar Sahili, a Hezbollah Member of Parliament, stated:
“I don't think that people will say we are the minority. I think that we are the
real majority in this country and all that we are asking is to share, all we are
asking is to have a government of national union where all the Lebanese civil
parties can share the power." (“WRAP Thousands of Hezbollah Supporters
Protest to Bring down Govt ADDS Reax.”)
Essentially, the insurgent group’s fight stems from and concerns the failed colonization and
subsequent decolonization. Hezbollah does not necessarily want to be a state, but rather it desires
to participate in the Lebanese government and have power commensurate with the Shiite
majority. This is evident as Hezbollah has been working to become more influential in the
central Lebanese government, rather than trying to dismantle it. Hezbollah is focused on gaining
control over the particular geographic area that it sees as belonging to it (Brown and Hermann,
2020). This central struggle is at the crux of Hezbollah’s goals and foundation.
Hezbollah’s foundational document announcing Hezbollah’s existence, in its 1985 Open
Letter, revealed its focus on ideology. The letter:
“Declared its obedience to “one leader, wise and just,” the Wali al-Faqih, and
itself a continuation of the Islamic revolution “made victorious by God in Iran.”
The group considered itself a transnational Shiite Islamic entity whose “behavior
is dictated” by the Wali al-Faqih, rather than “an organized or closed party in
Lebanon” (Hezbollah: An Introduction, 2018).
The Open Letter declared how Hezbollah was a movement against the Israeli occupation and
committed to protecting and safeguarding the Shi’a population. Hezbollah has made updates
over the years, however has noted that Hezbollah would remain committed to its original
orientations and that no major alterations would take place. Nasrallah stated that it would
“remain the same because they are at the heart of our movement”. Despite some alterations of
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the original document - one that is still ongoing and changing, Nasrallah has confirmed that
ideology and thought were at the heart and foundation of Hezbollah and will continue to remain
a part of it. One of these alterations to Open Letter was the addition of a Political Document in
2009. The Political document did acknowledge it would continue to focus on the Shi’a and
ideology; however, this document focused on the addition of adding a more political element to
Hezbollah and a move to having a greater influence in the Lebanese government. (Hezbollah: An
Introduction, 2018).
As shown in Appendix D, Lebanon in particular is composed of multiple selects with
different religions and ideologies, making it a very heterogeneous ethnic setting leading to high
levels of tensions. Hezbollah specifically was formed as a Shi’a militant group, composed of
primarily Shi’a constituents. The diverse and secular nature of Lebanon, creates a space for sects
to impose their ideologies and to create social order around the sects. With a lack of power
within government and in the country, Hezbollah worked to help gain Shi’a strength. A way to
gain strength for the Shi’a constituents was through delivering social service provisions that
would better their quality of life. In addition, the Shi’a of southern Lebanon were being occupied
by Israel. Consequently, Hezbollah had to offer its assistance to its people to protect the very
people for which the organization was founded. This assistance was as much in the form of
security and fighting as it was in the forms of food, water, and fuel. Therefore, even with
political motivation, ideology is a central pillar for Hezbollah to provide what it does.
Furthermore, and particularly important in the case of Hezbollah, is that ideology spans
borders. Hezbollah has a flourishing diaspora community that heavily participates in the strength
of the group back home in Lebanon. The focus on ideology as a uniting principle creates
linkages within the local community and around the world. The agglomeration centers around
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culture and ethnicity “facilitates the transnational links that enable global criminal enterprises to
flourish” (Brown and Hermann, 2020: 42). This is evident through the high degree of importance
and financial impact that the diaspora community has on Hezbollah. While this diaspora
community spans though America, Africa and more, the diaspora community also spans out
across local borders within the Middle East and North Africa. High levels of tension have
developed due to international borders being created based on control and resources, rather than
what made sense on the ground. This effectively divided ethnic communities. In a sense, rebel
governance could be a way to try to mitigate the tension of borders over ethnic zones, by helping
protect a certain group and ensure their well-being. Therefore, by starting the party as helping the
Shi’a primarily and protecting them from another outside threat, ideology played a central role in
Hezbollah’s actions.
Ideology shapes social order and can impact how civilians are treated, which is clear in
the case of Hezbollah. Scholars, such as Ana Arjona, argue that ideology does not affect the type
of governance that will evolve because groups need to adapt their strategies to more than
ideology or else, they will die out. However, Arjona does note that ideology can be very
important in directing the likelihood that a group creates a particular form of social order, and it
may affect the group's expectation of civilian cooperation and resistance. When ideology plays a
role, communities may have more autonomy in high-value territories because the group will
anticipate a high level of cooperation from the ideological relationship between the group and the
community (Arjona, 2019). These observations by Arjona are consistent with Hezbollah.
Ideology in the case of Hezbollah has acted as a primary factor in why Hezbollah has decided to
offer the vast degree of established social service provisions that it does. It is clear that there are
strategic options and goals in mind, however, Hezbollah was in part founded in an ideological

26

sense and has over time become more strategic. Hezbollah has a high expectation of civilian
cooperation, while at the same time communities are receiving a higher degree of autonomy for
that cooperation. Hezbollah created further unity within the party and amongst the community.
Further, Hezbollah has focused on uplifting the Shi’a based on its ideology which has developed
a high degree of social order.

Strategic reasons for providing provisions
It is understandable that armed actors will need to learn over time how to advance their causes
and will need to create a system or establish institutions that are more sustainable to fund its
operations and have a sustainable system of resources or influence. It makes sense that
Hezbollah would evolve from a resistance group against Israel focusing on ideological
connections to having more ambitious strategic goals. While ideology may continue to play a
factor, as noted with the evolving Open Letter document, strategic goals were put in place in the
Political Document in 2009. Nasrallah stated that this letter provided minor adjustments to the
group’s direction. Hezbollah's offering of social service provisions led Hezbollah to monopolize
control over the area and develop a growing influence. The move to more strategic goals is
observable through the evolution of its organizational structure with greater capacities. As
Hezbollah’s Deputy Secretary General Naim Qassem stated:

“Hezbollah paid particular attention to social work. Not one aspect of aiding
the poor was neglected as the party worked towards achieving joint social
responsibility, answering the urgent needs, and introducing beneficial
programs. Such work was simply considered Party duty, and concentrated
efforts towards raising funds and making available social service resources
served towards achieving these goals. The Party worked to the best of its
capabilities, cooperating with official institutions to respond to societal needs.”
(Love, 2010: 22)
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Gaining Popularity
As Hezbollah suffered from a civil war and is now suffering from a challenging economic crisis,
social service provisions being offered by the state are not as common. Hezbollah has been able
to take advantage of the lack of the Lebanese government's capacity to step in, to become more
influential and gain popularity among its constituents. As Hezbollah has realized its ability to
take advantage of the Lebanese government's low capacity, Hezbollah has begun widening its
base to reach other sects. One Hezbollah supporter stated when Hezbollah was able to provide oil
after the Lebanese government hadn’t been able to in months:

“It is a victory for the people of Lebanon who have been humiliated for asking for a little
bit of oil and fuel. It’s a victory for all the Lebanese people, from all sects. May
each person who says they are Lebanese keep their head up, I hope they will always
keep their head up. This is all thanks to Nasrallah and the blood of the martyrs.”
(AFP, director)

To continue to appear legitimate, the use of social service provisions was used to provide the
appearance that Hezbollah functions the same, if not better, functions than the nation-state itself.
Ana Arjona, noted in her work that during wartime, when state institutions are weak, it is likely
that new informal institutions will emerge by rebel groups because of the incentives to create
them (Arjona, 2019). When Lebanon’s institutions were weak, Hezbollah was able to form new
informal institutions in place of the existing, less functioning Lebanese institutions. Hezbollah
was incentivized by the ability to gain a wider base of support to achieve its broader strategic
goals.

Political Ambitions
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Hezbollah has been increasingly involved with the government and been gaining influence
among the Ministries. Therefore, it is logical to assume an incentive to provide social service
provisions is to gain popularity among the communities, as a strategy to solidify its place in
government. Social service provisions can instill some amount of popularity amongst the
constituents in its given territory. As identified by Arab Barometer, the Lebanese population
does not have much faith in the overall performance of the government, with nearly 70% of
those asked being extremely dissatisfied. More specifically, there was a lack of faith in the
government to provide education and healthcare services (less than 20% being satisfied with the
Lebanese government's performance) [Appendix E]. The population has little faith in the
government to provide essentials to survive and live fulfilling lives. Therefore, Hezbollah gains
popularity when it offers things that the government is not able to offer the people. Hezbollah
was able to identify a gap that the Lebanese government was not offering and services and the
growing concern among the Lebanese population. The Arab Barometer further demonstrated for
the Lebanese population the biggest concern was the economy (45 percent of those surveyed)
and the second highest concern was public services (15 percent of those surveyed) [Appendix F].
Hezbollah identifying this gap and growing concerns has begun extending services outside of
only Shi’a communities, as Hezbollah appears to be seeking a wider base of support. In line with
this, when successful social service provisions are offered, there is less likelihood that the
constituents will go against the rebel group. Hezbollah therefore has a larger number of
supporters to achieve their political ambitions while also minimizing dissent. Noticing that
Lebanon’s institutions were weak, Hezbollah's leadership was able to identify a time and an
opportunity to gain power in the community and then subsequently the government.
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Influence of Nasrallah
The strategic decision for Hezbollah to take advantage of the weak institutions for its own
political agenda was, in part, due to the leadership of Hezbollah, namely Secretary-General
Hassan Nasrallah. In general, leadership style and the relationship skills between the leaders and
participants is important to understanding the future of an organization and how it will be
influenced. It is likely that Nasrallah has made it a part of the Hezbollah identity to keep people
together and have that be a focal point for the organization and for what Hezbollah should focus
on. In the eyes of the Hezbollah constituents, Nasrallah is seen as working for the improvement
in the quality of life and increased political power for the Shi’a (Hermann and Gerard, 2009).
Further, in the eyes of Hezbollah, Nasrallah is viewed as a supreme leader or an ayatollah - a
religious leader among Shiite Muslims - wanting to shape Hezbollah into what it is today and
into the future. Nasrallah, as a strong leader with significant support from Hezbollah
constituents, has dictated the strategy of Hezbollah moving from an ideological based party to
one with strategic goals.
In a political leadership analysis, Hermann and Gerard, 2009) identify leadership traits
pertinent to Nasrallah’s leadership style regarding Hezbollah. Nasrallah exhibited a strategic
leadership style compared to other terrorist leaders and Middle Eastern national leaders,
indicating that he challenges constraints based on what is possible. Nasrallah is likely to be
incremental within his approach to its goals, sensitive to political timing, and paying attention to
what is relevant to the needs of its constituents. Further, Nasrallah is likely to handle constraints
directly, stating his goals and interests clearly. Nasrallah will view politics as conflict-prone but
can be managed and be an opportunity to take advantage of his own goals. When engaged in
political progress, Nasrallah exhibits the ideologue leadership style, signifying that he will work
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for what he perceives as an important role for Hezbollah and the role that Hezbollah should be
playing in the Lebanese political system. Given Nasrallah's leadership style, Nasrallah is focused
on taking advantage of opportunities that support Nasrallah's goals which focus on the survival
of Hezbollah and growing the power of the Shi’a in Lebanon. Over time, Nasrallah has become
more focused on the process and survival of the organization based on what is feasible (Hermann
and Gerard, 2009). This leadership assessment provides clues and pieces of evidence as to why
Hezbollah has expanded its ideological focus to a more strategic focus on governmental goals.

United Among Founding Principles
Hezbollah is likely to have offered social service provisions to continue to keep Hezbollah as a
united front as it continues to come into conflict with Israel. Israel's occupation is the foundation
of why Hezbollah has come into formation and continues to hold the position it does within
Lebanon. As Arjona highlights, groups are invented to help gain territorial control and strengthen
its organizational capacity. Thus, to make sure that Hezbollah is strengthened against Israel,
social service provisions will help to ensure that the population is strong and supportive of
Hezbollah's goals. Many of those who have joined Hezbollah are those who were kicked out of
Israel and are sympathetic to the cause. Support to these communities and Hezbollah's resident
population, ensures that they are going to continue to fight for Hezbollah, as Hezbollah was able
to offer these individuals more than they were receiving before. Additionally, these individuals
are receiving goods from an organization with the same enemies as themselves and share similar
goals. Tensions with Israel are continuing, thus having a base with a similar enemy that is
approving of Hezbollah will help Hezbollah further its own agenda. Hezbollah has made it a
point to demonstrate that Hezbollah will support those who are underrepresented, relating to how
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Hezbollah has used this thought as a founding principle. Israel has also been supporting the
Christian sect as both have been against Islam, which is a barrier to having more influence within
the Lebanese government. Thus, Hezbollah is seeking ways to maximize their supporters and
minimize the Christian base through a shared enemy.

Alternative Explanations
Some scholars have argued that rebel governance occurs when rebels seek control over an area in
order to obtain resources from the population. Jori Breslawski stated that rebels do not
“inherently seek to establish maximum control over governing activities,” but rather rebels are
resource poor and it is more efficient for rebels to devolve tasks to citizens (Breslawski, 2016:
453-479). Further, rebel organizations have their constituents produce resources for them in
order to maintain themselves. Ana Arjona also similarly argues that “groups will try to
monopolize the means of violence, extract resources from local inhabitants and promote capital
accumulation” (Arjona, 2019: 7). This is a less likely possible explanation, as Hezbollah is not
obtaining its resources from its constituents, rather Hezbollah is offering resources to its
constituents. While Hezbollah does obtain some resources from its constituents, it is not
sufficient enough for this to be a more viable answer.
Some scholars have argued that when rebel governance occurs, rebels will only help their
constituency. It is argued that when rebels view civilians as part of their constituency, it is more
efficient for rebels to establish governing institutions. Originally, Hezbollah was only focusing
on those with the same ideology/religious identity, however this did not necessarily make it more
efficient for Hezbollah to establish what they are doing. Rather, as more strategic goals unfolded,
Hezbollah began working to assist other groups in order to have a larger base of support.
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Duality of a State and Organization
Hezbollah is particularly interesting given that it acts as both an organization and a state, having
become both a very strong influential political organization while operating with similar
functions to a nation-state. Many consider Hezbollah a ‘state within a state,' as it seeks to have
political influence, while also the goal of being autonomous in the region with its own rules and
military (Brown and Hermann, 2020). The duality of being like a formal state, while also being a
functioning rebel organization and political party, is important in the analysis of supporting that
Hezbollah functions as a rebel governance to gain political power in the government.
As a state of its own, other countries do treat Hezbollah as its own entity, even without an
international recognition of sovereignty. For example, Iran has in many ways treated Hezbollah
as a state through the building of a relationship between the leaders and sharing of goods and
services. Hezbollah also influences Lebanese politics and decision-making, demonstrating that it
has the functions of its government. Hezbollah therefore has domestic influence, social influence
through the delivering of provisions and international recognition by recognized sovereign
nations. Furthermore, Hezbollah’s military and security measures are recognized by other parts
of the world. It has been noted the strength of its military to even have the capacity to take power
in Lebanon - Hezbollah does not seem to have an interest in doing so, nor is it in its interest.
Hezbollah’s military has also been used to fight in conflicts outside of its own, such as in the
case of Syria, where it even exported its own services. With functions as a state, Hezbollah is
able to appear legitimate, giving Hezbollah continents and the Lebanese population a reason to
support their political agenda.
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As an organization, it would not be beneficial for Hezbollah to try to become a state as
Lebanon’s non-Shi’a communities would pave the way for unrest and would likely seek external
support which could spark another civil war in Lebanon. Instead, Hezbollah has been able to
gain legitimacy within the Lebanese state, but without the accountability that a normal state
would otherwise hold. As an organization Hezbollah does not have full responsibility for the
Lebanese people avoiding high levels of domestic scrutiny. Not being the sole authority allows
Hezbollah to not have to meet all the calls for delivering things to citizens, especially as it does
not have full capacity to fulfill all citizens' demands. The lack of transparency by not being a
formal institution allows Hezbollah to avoid calls for accountability. Further as an organization
as opposed to a state, Hezbollah can still obtain aid from around the world and particularly from
many Western governments. Since many of these Western governments classify Hezbollah as a
terrorist organization, if Hezbollah were to seize power, Lebanon would be cut off from aid
which it is very dependent on. Hezbollah and Lebanon cannot afford for it to be cut off from aid
even with successful social service provisions. Hassan Nasrallah has been vocal about rejecting
the possibility of Hezbollah taking over Lebanon, even if it were under the pretext of ‘reform’
and regularly assures the Lebanese people that he does not want to ignite more sectarian tension
or provoke another civil war. This message is also beneficial for Hezbollah to demonstrate that
the party is content with its share of power in Lebanon, it is respectful of other elites, and it is
presented as post-sectarian. As an organization, Hezbollah does not need to follow the normal
rules and structures and can function with more freedom. Therefore, they cannot answer the calls
for accountability and continue to have influence within the government.
Lebanon is likely to be okay with this structure and setup because it does not want to
have more sectarian fights within its borders, thus a reason for Lebanon to be willing to have
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Hezbollah allowed within the governmental system. Hezbollah’s hybrid status is ideal for the
future of its organization as it can continue to gain power without facing the prospect of civil war
or international sanctions on the country and it can intimidate its opponents while using its status
as the only group other than the Lebanese Armed forces supporting national defense, allowing
them to continue having weapons. Further, it does not need to be responsible for the needs of the
citizens (Khatib, 2016). The dualism that Hezbollah is structured around provides further
evidence toward their strategic ambitions and subsequent continued use of social service
provisions.
Future Questions to Consider
Based on this research question, other questions of sovereignty and academic definitions in this
field can be further examined. While I raise other questions, it is not within the scope of this
paper to address these further, however they can be addressed in other research papers.
Sovereignty
Hezbollah does lack international recognition of sovereignty. A key component of the cultural
narrative of the Southern Lebanese people has been sovereignty and freedom from outside
intervention (Brown and Hermann, 2020). As per rebel governance literature, sovereignty is the
most important characteristic that rebel governance lacks. Hezbollah therefore cannot exist as a
traditional definition of a state because it lacks international recognition. However, these are
questions as to what sovereignty really means and the value that it holds. Hezbollah challenges
the standard definition of sovereignty: it acts and functions as a state, while it is also a political
organization and a transnational group with undetermined borders (being its diaspora
community). The diaspora community is in many ways how Hezbollah is staying alive and
therefore necessary to consider.
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Over the years, scholars have begun to challenge globalization by noting that a large
territory is not needed to be considered sovereign. Hezbollah demonstrates another challenge to
the ideas of the international border that are currently in place. International borders are critical
against criminal operations, particularly regarding where to locate decisions and arbitration. As
Brown and Hermann argue, “it is the change in the jurisdictional authority that appears to be the
key to why borders—or borderlands—are critical” (Brown and Hermann, 2020: 171). However,
Brown and Hermann also note how laws and regulations change with international borders, but
globalization has made borders more fluid and less secure, creating ease for illicit goods to flow
just as licit ones do. This benefits Hezbollah as it can act as a state, while being dependent on
illicit financing, despite not having recognition of sovereignty. Further, it has made thinking
about becoming one’s own state more prevalent. Griffiths observed that with an increase in
globalization, “small states can survive by plugging into the global economy to secure capital
and resources and leverage their combative advantage” (Griffiths, 2016: 7). Hezbollah therefore
can plug into the global economy to act as a state, with some semblance of autonomy within
Lebanon without the title of sovereignty and a traditional state system. Without the traditional
frame of sovereignty, illicit activities become a much more necessary method to fund providing
goods, services and protection needed to control a specific area. Some scholars question whether
non-state actors like Hezbollah would remain a part of the illicit global economy if they were to
have state status. This is complicated by the separation of ethnic groups.
With Hezbollah more interested in political influence and autonomy within an already
recognized state, this calls into question who gets to decide which borders count. It is also noted
that some areas where there is politically motivated violence become considered ‘sovereign
territory’ as the group assumes political authority over the area. Some literature could call
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Hezbollah’s territory as sovereign territory, given that Hezbollah uses violence and that it has a
military power of its own, even one stronger than the state. There is already tension within
literature and academics as to what factors must be present to be considered sovereign. Further,
Agnew has observed this same idea when studying globalization and noted that it “seems to be
more geographically differentiating than homogenizing in its effects” for those engaged in
transnational criminal activities. Therefore, sovereignty has become a local phenomenon (Brown
and Hermann, 2020: 27).

Field Definitions
Potentially, our studies can address nuances and gaps in the literature by addressing definitional
problems in the field - specifically concerning proto-state, rebel governance and transnational
groups. There is a difference between insurgent groups, terrorist groups and transnational
criminal organization. Hezbollah has shown that it fits into more than one kind of group within
the bounds of rebel governance. Perhaps rebel governance is too broad to consider the modern
elements of rebel groups and all these groups cannot be considered rebel governance. Rather
rebel governance serves as a starting point for evaluation to then examine how each of these
groups can fit under an umbrella scope. Hezbollah can therefore pull apart our definitions and
think about rebel groups and how their unique attributes can fit into more exclusive definitions.
Hezbollah provides rebel governance but is also considered a proto-state. A proto-state is defined
as a ‘“particular type of political unit, one that is organized administratively [within a sovereign
state], given some degree of autonomy, and is typically ... constructed around a local ethnic
group” (Griffiths, 2016: 219). These are “juridically separate communities of people who
purportedly have special claims to the jurisdiction as a homeland” (Roeder, 2017: 12-13)’
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(Brown and Hermann, 2020: 61). Brown and Hermann recognize Hezbollah as fitting this
definition of proto-state. While insurgent groups are complex and evolving, it is important that
for addressing global problems, the academic community has a clear understanding of how to
organize these groups appropriately. Having a clear definition will help inform the international
community on the best forms of action for dealing with these groups and the populations they are
working with all the while addressing their nuances. Better understanding of the uniqueness of
each group and steers away from viewing these groups in simplistic assumptions and the
dichotomy of rebels versus freedom fighters seeking to gain popular support based on good
behavior and ideological propaganda versus a simplistic emphasis on the criminal behavior of
non-state armed organizations (Arjona, 2019). This leads people to view civilians as either
politically supportive of the rebels or cowed and victimized by them (Arjona, 2019).
Importance of Understanding Rebel Governance
Understanding rebel governance is essential not only to having a sense of what is going on on the
ground, but also as to how to best protect civilians in war zones or conflict areas. The current
understanding of conflict zones does not acknowledge nuances and the political situation on the
ground. Rather, it assumes that without the state exerting control, there must be chaos
(Mampilly, 2015). An examination of Hezbollah runs counter to that premise. Areas run by rebel
groups have proven to have high levels of organizational function and control over a given
territory without being under the auspices of a state. Further, understanding rebel governance can
provide significant information when transitioning out of a conflict and can be key to
understanding the potential for post conflict peace (Mampilly, 2015). An understanding of rebel
governance is not only important to understanding day to day relations, but also to developing
longer term solutions and stability. An examination of structures and practices developed by a
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rebel group can potentially become constructed into more formal governmental structures in a
post conflict resolution setting.
When international actors seek to provide aid to those in war zones, they often overlook
the situation on the ground. This often leads to a mishandling of goods and aid not being
delivered as desired. A clearer understanding of rebel governance can be important in academia,
but also in establishing the best possible policy recommendations. If the goal is truly to deliver
humanitarian assistance to those in need, then understanding how rebel governance functions is a
critical step. Understanding these functions can lead to how to put aid in the best hands. In
another sense, rebels who have developed to provide high levels of services can act as a model
for how to best deliver goods and services in war zones or conflict areas. These rebel groups
have demonstrated how to govern and function in complex political zones, as well as during
ongoing conflict. Furthermore, rebels with well-functioning organizations and structures, have a
high level of capacity to offer services to their constituents. This can be a critical lesson learned
by international players.
Hezbollah lays out an analysis of how to best provide social service provisions when a
government cannot do so. The constituents in Hezbollah's territory are able to survive due to
Hezbollah’s ability to offer security, provide an organizational structure and conflict mechanism,
and obtain necessary goods. Hezbollah has demonstrated a very high level of capacity to offer
these services and provisions. In addition, they have worked in parallel with the government,
demonstrating how a rebel group can function with higher capacity than an existing and
internationally recognized government.
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Appendix B. Organizational Chart of Hezbollah.
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Appendix C. Locations of Hezbollah involvement in Syrian Civil War highlighted with black
flags.

42

Appendix D. Religious Domination in Hezbollah.

Appendix E. Degree of Satisfaction by Citizens in Lebanon.
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Appendix F. What the Lebanese population finds as the biggest challenges to the country as of
2021.
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